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Highlight: Cambodian Front Media on Mil. Advances, "Nat. Cong." TCP 09-75

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F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

HIGHLIGHT:

Cambodian Front Media on Military
Advances, "National Congress" - page 1

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7 MARCH 1975

C O R R E C T I O N

FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 5 March 1975, China section,
page 15:

First paragraph of page fifteen, lines one and two should read:
Two heads of government who recently visited China are not known
to have been received by CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung. x x x

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INDOCHINA

CAMBODIAN FRONT LAUDS MILITARY ADVANCE, HOLDS 2D CONGRESS

Cambodian insurgent media predictably acclaim communist military advances, portraying Phnom Penh as hopelessly isolated with the loss of the Mekong River supply route and intensified communist artillery attacks around the capital. The U.S. air lift has been sharply criticized in a statement by Sihanouk, but there has been no official protest from the insurgent government (RGNU) since ministry statements were issued on 15 February.

Although the media have reported that the 2d national congress of the Cambodian Front (NUFC) was convened in late February, little of substance has been revealed about its deliberations. There is no indication whether the congress, in the face of the insurgents' favorable military situation, considered a concrete program aimed at assuming power. A press communique on the congress repeated standard Front positions: it declared that Lon Nol and the other top seven Cambodian Government leaders must be eliminated and demanded that the United States end its involvement and allow the Cambodians to solve their problems without interference. The communique did not raise the question of negotiations, but Front media have carried a Sihanouk statement rejecting negotiations with "the Phnom Penh traitors."

NUFC CONGRESS The two-day "national congress," said to have been held by the NUFC in the "liberated zone" on 24 and 25 February, was the second such Front conclave. An earlier national congress, held on 19-21 July 1973, had similarly been attended by representatives of the NUFC, mass organizations, the military, and ministers and deputy ministers of the insurgent government (RGNU), and had been chaired by RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan.

The only report on the congress was a 26 February "press communique" which noted that the situation in Cambodia had "significantly altered." However, it adhered to standard, vague rhetoric, demanding that the United States cease its involvement in Cambodia so that the Cambodians can settle their own affairs. The communique proclaimed that it was "absolutely necessary to put an end to the existence" (banhchab veasna) of Lon Nol and the other seven top Phnom Penh leaders--Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tam, Long Boret, and Sosthene Fernandez. But, like other Front statements

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which have called for the "annihilation" of Lon Nol and the others, it offered a place in the NUFC for other low- or high-ranking government officials, officers, and others, if they "immediately cease their service to the seven traitors and stop cooperating with them." While claiming that "the enemy is on the verge of collapse in every field" and that Phnom Penh was "surrounded," the communique offered no evaluation of Front prospects for total victory.

The 1973 congress had not prompted a "press communique" but it had issued a 21 July statement addressed to "friendly" countries and peoples, signed by Khieu Samphan, RGNU interior minister Hou Youn, and propaganda minister Hu Nim.* Perhaps because it was addressed to a foreign audience, the 1973 statement had been circumspect in its reference to Front intentions for the Phnom Penh leadership--noting only that their fate would be decided by the Cambodian "nation and people without foreign interference."

This year's congress communique gave less attention to Sihanouk than the 1973 statement which referred to him several times. The communique reaffirmed the substance of Sihanouk's five-point declaration of March 1970, but did not cite it by name, and it referred to him only once by name, noting his role as chief of state. With respect to NUFC policies, the 26 February communique reaffirmed the Front's long-standing pledge to establish a government which will follow an independent and nonaligned foreign policy and which will not tolerate the maintenance of foreign military bases on Cambodian soil. The communique renewed previous warnings to the diplomatic and foreign communities in Phnom Penh to evacuate immediately and declared again that the Front will not bear responsibility for casualties incurred if they fail to do so. The communique also announced the successful completion of a period of gradual elimination of the use of GKR currency in liberated areas, through the institution of a barter system, and the decision to begin the gradual introduction of a new RGNU currency.

* Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim were probably the only RGNU ministers in the liberated zone at the time of the first national congress. Since a decision of November 1973 to move all RGNU ministries to the liberated zone, portfolios of several more ministers have been gradually transferred, the latest of which was accomplished last November. As ranking RGNU official attending, Khieu Samphan alone signed the second national congress' communique.

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SIHANOUK STATEMENTS,
NEGOTIATION ISSUE:

While the NUFC congress communiqué did not mention the issue of a negotiated settlement, Front media have publicized Sihanouk's comments on the question, including a statement issued in Peking on 25 February and his open letter to President Ford. In the 25 February statement, summarized by NCNA on the 26th and carried in full by the Front news agency AKI on 4 March, Sihanouk sharply criticized U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Habib for the suggestion that the Sihanouk government's opposition to negotiations was linked to the refusal of Congress to grant aid to Phnom Penh. Sihanouk recalled that in his recent cable to Senator Mansfield and other congressmen he had specified that "even if the U.S. Congress gives additional credits of several billion dollars more to the Lon Nol regime, the NUFC, the RGNU, the CPNLAF, and Norodom Sihanouk will never accept to negotiate with the Phnom Penh traitors."

The question of negotiations was also addressed by Sihanouk in a 3 March statement, excerpted by NCNA on the following day but not yet available from Cambodian Front media. The statement again strongly attacked the notion that U.S. aid to Lon Nol encourages the Front to negotiate, declaring flatly that even if the Khmer Republic were in a position of strength with the help of U.S. aid, it could "never make the NUFC, RGNU, and the CPNLAF and Norodom Sihanouk change their stand and accept 'negotiations,' 'compromise,' and other nonsense." While strongly stating that the Front would "never go to the negotiating table" and "never accept 'compromise' with U.S. neocolonialism and its Phnom Penh quislings," the statement, as reported by NCNA, did not comment specifically on the possibility of talks with a government other than Lon Nol's.*

While some of Sihanouk's recent communications to U.S. officials and the press have noted that the RGNU could normalize relations with the United States if it were no longer involved in Cambodia, his 3 March statement was much less positive. Sihanouk instead warned in the statement:

If [the United States] does not rapidly put an end to its sinister "air bridge" which threatens the Cambodian people with genocide, if it gives its Phnom Penh quislings new financial and other aid, [it] will no longer be possible for the U.S. Government to reconcile and restore diplomatic relations.

* AFP on 4 March did quote the deputy chief of the RGNU mission in France as rejecting this possibility, asserting that: "We do not accept to negotiate. If the Americans want to change horses, that does not concern us."

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DRV, PRG SAY CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS TO SAIGON "LACK GOODWILL"

The U.S. congressional delegation's visit to Vietnam made at the urging of the Ford Administration in connection with the supplemental aid request for the GVN has received low-keyed attention in Vietnamese communist media. News reports on the delegation's activities have claimed that President Thieu was attempting to appear less "repressive" for their benefit and that the U.S. Embassy was attempting to "restrict" their contacts. Press communiques issued by the DRV and PRG military delegations to the Joint Military Commission specifically criticized the legislators' charges of communist foot-dragging in the search for U.S. personnel still missing in action.

The press communiques--released after the congressmen's 2 March interview with the DRV and PRG military delegations at their headquarters at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase--both complained that the meetings had failed to provide a "useful exchange of views" because of the "lack of goodwill" of certain members of the delegation. The DRV communique singled out Senator Dewey Bartlett and representatives William Chappel and John Flynt for what it termed their "distortion" of the DRV's attitude on the issue of the missing U.S. personnel. According to the DRV communique, DRV Lt. Col. Nguyen Duc Bao pointed out that it has been the "intensified military involvement" by the United States in Vietnam and its use of the Saigon administration to "sabotage" the Paris agreement that has caused the breakdown in the implementation of many provisions of the agreement, including the search for the dead and missing. Bao demanded that the United States respond to the 8 October 1974 PRG statement that called for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the overthrow of President Thieu* and for the United States to "fulfill its obligation" under Article 21 of the Paris agreement--which provides for U.S. assistance in DRV postwar reconstruction. The PRG communique, quoting remarks by PRG delegation head Maj. Gen. Hoang Anh Tuan, leveled virtually the same charges as the DRV communique.

DRV EDITORIAL MARKS 1973 INTERNATIONAL VIETNAM CONFERENCE

The second anniversary of the signing of the "Act" of the international conference on Vietnam in Paris has been marked by Hanoi with a 1 March NHAN DAN editorial strongly castigating the United

* For a discussion of the PRG statement, see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 11-12.

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States for alleged "betrayal" of its commitments under the Paris agreement. A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast for the anniversary on the 2d took essentially the same tack by denouncing the United States not only for "seriously sabotaging" the Paris agreement and the international act but for its "clearly revealed intention of increasing its military involvement in South Vietnam and Cambodia even more."

Last year, the first anniversary of the signing of the Act occasioned DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry notes that were addressed to participants of the conference, except for the United States and the Saigon government.* While this year's NHAN DAN editorial and Liberation Radio commentary constitute a lower-level format, the complaints and charges they contain are similar. Like last year's notes, the editorial claimed the pledges the United States made in Paris two years ago were "violated right from the start," and it reiterated the routine allegations of U.S. military equipment and personnel being sent to South Vietnam, of Nguyen Van Thieu being used by the United States to continue the war, of U.S. encroachments into DRV territorial waters and airspace, and of U.S. refusal to honor the obligation under the Paris agreement to help with DRV reconstruction.

However, whereas the notes last year failed to mention Cambodia, this year's NHAN DAN editorial and Liberation Radio commentary are replete with accusations of "illegal" activities being carried out by the United States in Cambodia. The editorial bitterly decried the Ford Administration for speaking of U.S. "ethical obligations and moral commitments" to justify its role in South Vietnam and Cambodia and with unusual rancor declared that "the peoples of Indochina and the world and U.S. progressives spit on this kind of morality"

* See the TRENDS of 6 March 1974, pages 11-12, for a discussion of the foreign ministry notes marking the first anniversary.

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PATHET LAO, ALLIES EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH LAO ACCORDS

The 21 February second anniversary of the Vientiane agreement ending the war in Laos occasioned the traditional rally, speeches, LPF Central Committee statement, and radio editorials from the Pathet Lao, and evoked favorable media comment from Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi. Pathet Lao celebrations centered around the 21 February "grand rally" in Viengsay, addressed by Lao Patriotic Front Standing Committee member Phoun Sipraseuth, the highest ranking LPF official in attendance, and Patriotic Neutralist Forces Standing Committee member Phagna Peng. Last year's rally was addressed by LPF Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit and PNF Alliance Committee Vice-Chairman Deuan Sunnalat, with LPF Vice-Chairman Sithon Kommadam also present.*

Phoun Sipraseuth's speech was positive in tone, recounting the gains achieved during the past year in reconstructing the "liberated zone," and commenting favorably upon the achievements of the National Political Coalition Council (NPCC) and the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU). Phoumi Vongvichit's speech at the first anniversary--coming before the final formation of the coalition government in April 1974--had reflected LPF doubts as to the durability of the agreement and the intentions of the "Vientiane side," and included lengthy complaints about Vientiane "violations" of the peace accord. Pathet Lao radio commentaries and editorials commemorating this year's event and the 21 February LPF Central Committee statement closely reflected the tone and content of Phoun Sipraseuth's speech, echoing his assertion that despite "difficulties" the "postwar political, economic and cultural struggle" would "inevitably" result in victory.

Moscow, Peking and Hanoi commentaries on the anniversary also reflected general satisfaction with political developments in Laos during the past two years. Moscow noted the event with commentary similar in tone, warmth, and level of importance to last year's treatment, and reiterated standard expressions of approval for the accomplishments of the PGNU and the NPCC.

* Phoumi Vongvichit currently serves as PGNU Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister in Vientiane, and Deuan Sunnalat is PGNU Secretary of State for the Interior.

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Signed articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR reviewed the major events of the past year, with PRAVDA's correspondent Skvortsov hailing the formation of the NPCC, headed by Lao Patriotic Front Chairman Souphanouvong, and the promulgation of the NPCC's 18-point political program as "real shifts in achieving national concord" that contributed to making peace in Laos "increasingly reliable."

Peking marked the anniversary with an NCNA correspondent's dispatch from Vientiane, reflecting the PRC's usual low posture in commenting on events in Laos. Last year, however, Peking had observed the first anniversary of the Vientiane agreement with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. This year's dispatch was optimistic in tone, citing the success of the "Lao people" in frustrating the efforts of the "Vientiane ultra-rightists" to sabotage the peace accord, and, as in last year's Commentator article, approvingly noting the Lao people's achievements at reconstruction through their "revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and hard struggle."

Hanoi observed the anniversary with editorials in the 21 February NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, a 17 February NHAN DAN article by Vice Premier and President of the DRV-Laos Friendship Association Tran Huu Duc, and a "solidarity week" with Laos culminating in a 20 February meeting in Hanoi featuring speeches hailing Lao-DRV relations. Unlike last year, this year's anniversary did not prompt a foreign ministry statement. NHAN DAN's editorial devoted as much attention to the United States' role in Indochina as it did to the "great victory" of the Lao people, claiming that despite "many obstacles" the situation in Laos was developing "contrary to U.S. desires" and that the United States and the Vientiane "reactionary clique" could not "reverse the wheel of history." Other editorial comment and speeches echoed similar themes.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW HITS U.S. ON PALESTINIANS, SKIRTS EGYPT-PLO RIFT

While Soviet media have continued to criticize U.S. diplomacy in routine terms for seeking to promote "partial" Arab-Israeli peace accords, one of Moscow's top specialists on the Middle East, Igor Belyayev,* charged last week that the United States plans to avoid talks on the Palestinian issue for at least two more years, until "a new administration is in the White House." This is the first Soviet assertion of such a U.S. position on the Palestinian question, and carries pessimistic implications for progress toward an overall Mideast peace settlement before 1977. Belyayev additionally reiterated the standard Soviet charge that Israel "and the forces behind it" were attempting to "freeze" the question of a comprehensive settlement, "striving at all costs to substitute partial accords for it." At the same time, however, Moscow has apparently sought to avoid too heavy-handed an approach to the U.S.-assisted Arab-Israeli peace discussions. Soviet media have thus far typically played down Secretary Kissinger's next round of Mideast talks, scheduled to resume 7 March, and have not exploited recent indications that President as-Sadat is under increased Palestinian pressure to reject a separate agreement with Israel.

BELYAYEV Writing in the current issue of the weekly Soviet
ARTICLE journal, ZA RUBEZHOM, signed to press 27 February,
Belyayev was outspoken in his criticism of U.S.
and Israeli diplomacy. In a section called "Root of the Evil"--
presumably intended to answer the article's title question, "Who
Is Inflaming the Hotbed of Tension?"--he characterized prospective
Israel-Egyptian agreements, primarily a new Sinai disengagement
accord, as designed by Tel Aviv to serve as "political agreements
without any link to an overall settlement." He said this

* From 1957-1970 Belyayev was associated with PRAVDA and wrote extensively on Middle East topics. At one time, he was a deputy foreign editor; at another, the editor of PRAVDA's Asia and Africa department. Since late 1970 he has been identified as deputy director of the Africa Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, but continues to contribute articles to PRAVDA and other journals.

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would postpone "for a long time" the "most important part of a settlement," Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories captured in 1967. Belyayev further declared that

U.S. diplomacy does not intend either to prompt Israel to embark on talks on the Palestinian problem or to take it on itself until the beginning of 1977, that is, when a new administration is in the White House." Here too, there is obviously a trend toward freezing yet another problem which comprises the crux of a Near East settlement.

Belyayev's accusations take on added significance against the background of Brezhnev's Mideast remarks in a 14 February Kremlin speech, recalled by Belyayev, that partial measures are useful only if they lead to a comprehensive settlement and if they are not used to "freeze" the situation or delay a settlement.

Belyayev's remark about a "new administration" was ambiguous, but he later cited views expressed in Lebanon to the effect that when preparations for the U.S. Presidential elections begin "this fall," the "present U.S. Administration's position" would become completely pro-Israel. Charges of "Zionist" influence on Congress and over U.S. elections are not infrequent in Soviet comment, and Belyayev's remarks may reflect a belief that neither major party can afford to alienate pro-Israeli U.S. voters.

Belyayev remarked that "neither Israel nor the United States have so far recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization" (PLO) and went on to reaffirm Moscow's support for the PLO and for the creation of a Palestinian national entity. He recalled that the resolutions of the October 1974 Arab summit conference in Rabat had, in part, "approved the idea of establishing an independent Arab Palestine" and had "recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Arab Palestinian people." Belyayev speculated that if "disengagement of forces on the West Bank" were achieved, faithfulness to the Rabat decisions would dictate creation of a "Palestinian national administration on this territory," adding that "the PLO should form it" and noting that Arab oil producers had pledged to support it financially.

Touching on Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO, Belyayev strongly implied that Jordanian mediation would have been a possible solution, since Israel has maintained it will talk about a West Bank settlement only with King Husayn. Belyayev said that

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Jordan had itself proposed mediation "as recently as January"--an apparent reference to the 3-4 January conference in Cairo of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and a PLO representative. However, Belyayev professed to find it "understandable" that the Palestinians opposed mediation, in view of the Rabat resolutions and the Palestinians' perceived danger that Jordanian mediation would lead to a campaign for a "united Hashemite kingdom" with Jordanian and Palestinian "provinces," rather than to creation of an "independent Arab Palestine."

EGYPT-PLO Soviet media have minimized the recent exchange of
RELATIONS public recriminations between Cairo and the PLO,
 barely hinting in brief TASS reports that the
conflict arose from PLO criticism of Egypt's apparent receptiveness
to a new disengagement accord with Israel that would ignore
Palestinian interests. As reflected in Arab media, the dispute
developed after publication on 26 February of a PLO executive
committee statement transparently critical of Cairo's alleged
willingness to sacrifice Palestinian rights and betray the "Arab
national cause" for the sake of regaining captured territory. In
Moscow's first notice of the controversy, TASS on the 28th briefly
cited a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) report that as-Sadat,
following publication of a PLO statement "about plans for a
Mideast settlement," had refused to meet with a PLO executive
committee delegation to discuss Palestinian issues. TASS later
the same day reported that the PLO executive committee had
met recently in Damascus and issued a statement criticizing U.S.
plans for a "partial" settlement and calling on "all leaders
of Arab countries" to strengthen Arab unity and observe the
resolutions of Arab summit conferences at Algiers (November 1973)
and Rabat (October 1974).

By 3 March, TASS reports indicated that public differences between
the two sides were being resolved and seemed implicitly to lay
the blame for the controversy on elements of the Cairo press. TASS
that day, while citing MENA reports on the Cairo-PLO rift and
tracing it to the PLO statement "concerning Egypt's actions in
the direction of a Middle East settlement," principally highlighted
the sides' efforts to achieve reconciliation. TASS reported an
Egyptian government official's remarks that as-Sadat had issued
directives to continue bilateral contacts with the PLO and "not
to create conditions for a split," and also reported that as-Sadat
was willing to meet with the entire PLO executive committee to
discuss Palestinian issues and Egyptian-PLO relations. Referring
to recent meetings of the Egyptian information and foreign

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ministers with a PLO delegation, TASS on the 3d cited a Beirut AN-NAHAR report that the talks had established that certain materials in the Cairo press recently on Egypt's relations with the PLO "do not reflect the positions of the Egyptian leadership" and that agreement had been reached "to end all kinds of campaigns and actions leading to a split between Egypt and the PLO."

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GREECE

MOSCOW CHIDES ATHENS FOR NOT PURGING PRO-JUNTA OFFICERS

Soviet comment on the 24 February thwarting of a coup planned by some Greek army officers has faulted Athens for not having moved earlier to purge military supporters of the former junta. Moscow has, however, been careful to criticize the Karamanlis government only by indirection. For example, PRAVDA's Drobkov on the 27th pointed up the "lack of determination and inconsistency" employed against the "embittered resistance" of the holdovers from the military dictatorship. And Vladimir Dunayev on Moscow radio's 2 March observers' roundtable program maintained that Greeks "everywhere" were asking why the junta supporters had not yet been purged. Dunayev also seemed to suggest government indecision or ignorance of the plot in stating that the coup was foiled only "at the last minute." A Zholkver Greek-language commentary on the 26th portrayed the surfacing of the coup plot as demonstrating the validity of earlier "serious warnings" by the Greek left, especially the communists.

Moscow has also appeared to imply a continued unwillingness on the part of Karamanlis to mount a purge of all pro-junta officers in pointing out that the government has minimized the threat posed by the coup plotters. Zholkver dismissed the "first official statement" as understating the number of plotters and cited press reports that some 200 senior officers had been involved. Dunayev also noted that information on the coup was "contradictory and fragmentary" and cited "UN official information" as implicating more than 300 generals and officers. Thus far, the government has reported the arrest of fewer than 40 officers.

In line with previous treatment of the Greek political situation, Moscow comment on the planned coup routinely accused NATO and the CIA of supporting the fallen junta and of backing pro-junta elements in the military. But it stopped short of charging NATO or CIA complicity in planning the coup. While Moscow has up to now portrayed the domestic political situation as "more favorable" than that under the junta, and has praised the Karamanlis government for its "realistic" stand on the Cyprus issue, it had evinced some concern that Athens may not go far enough in reducing its military ties to NATO and the United States. Thus a Vladimirov commentary in the 13 February IZVESTIYA noted that Greek efforts to renegotiate the status of U.S. bases would require "political courage." Vladimirov also professed to see "certain pro-NATO circles" as willing to seek a compromise with Washington allowing some bases to remain in Greece.

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C S C E

MOSCOW MIXES OPTIMISM, CAUTION IN ASSESSING PROGRESS OF TALKS

Since the 20 January resumption in Geneva of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Moscow has adopted a tone of optimism over prospects for success, tempered with caution regarding outstanding issues still to be resolved. Soviet commentators have pointed to the military-related "confidence-building measures" as the greatest stumbling block, with humanitarian issues posing fewer difficulties. Moscow has welcomed the agreement in principle for a summit finale expressed by British Prime Minister Wilson during his mid-February talks with Brezhnev and has reported various preparations for a concluding summit conference. Summing up the current situation, PRAVDA's Yuriy Zhukov observed on 4 March on Moscow radio that despite the endorsement of a summit finale now by almost all the major Western leaders, "there is still plenty to be done in Geneva."

BREZHNEV REMARKS The view that it is now time to move on to the finale by reaching agreement on what Moscow calls the "principal objectives" of the conference was again underlined by Brezhnev in his speech at the Kremlin dinner for visiting British Prime Minister Wilson on 14 February. Noting that "no small amount of work has already been done, but far from all that is necessary is as yet being done," Brezhnev declared that the "immediate task now is to successfully and befittingly complete" the conference. As he has done repeatedly in the past, Brezhnev again stressed that the conference should only attempt a solution of those problems which can be solved at the present time. What is important, he said, is the ability to single out "the principal objectives from the superficial elements engendered by shortsighted political maneuvering aimed at obtaining various momentary advantages for some participants in the negotiations to the detriment of others."

TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin, who acted as Brezhnev's press spokesman during the Wilson visit, amplified Brezhnev's remarks on the outstanding issues in Moscow radio's observers roundtable program on the 16th. According to Zhukov, Brezhnev "said during the negotiations" that "one must now concentrate on holding the conference for solving the main issue--that of insuring European security--and not fumble with various petty matters of secondary or tertiary importance which sometimes arise at the Geneva talks so as to drag out its preparation."

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OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS The inability to reach agreement on the so-called "confidence-building measures" has been singled out in recent comment on the CSCE as the chief remaining problem. This aspect was cited in a 21 January PRAVDA article by Dmitriyev pegged to the resumption of the second phase of the talks, and again in a 24 January NEW TIMES article under the authoritative signature of "M. Lvov." IZVESTIYA chief editor Lev Tolkunov in a 1 March article stressed this same difficulty. He remarked that there had been "success" in reaching preliminary agreement on the exchange of observers at military exercises and the exchange of military delegations. But "the main question--advance information on large-scale military exercises--is in fact being used," Tolkunov said, "for unjustified attempts to impose control on the armed forces and armaments of states."

Soviet commentators have offered a more positive assessment of the agreements reached on the agenda's third point, humanitarian issues. Tolkunov, in an earlier IZVESTIYA article, on 27 February, observed that "it must be said that considerably fewer attempts have been noted recently" in trying to impose "conditions which border on interference in domestic affairs." He added that this attitude had had an "immediate effect" on the work on the third agenda item.

On the issue of interference in Soviet domestic affairs, Moscow in routine comment has denied that the cancellation of the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement would adversely affect the course of the CSCE. A statement to this effect by the Soviet delegation in Geneva--apparently not acknowledged in Moscow media--was reported by the Polish news agency on 4 February. PAP cited the USSR delegation as "flatly" rebutting Western press speculation that the Soviet decision on the trade agreement "would have an adverse bearing on the course" of the conference. PAP also reported an American spokesman in Geneva as having expressed agreement with the Soviet statement.

PLANNING FOR SUMMIT Despite acknowledgment of outstanding difficulties still to be resolved, Moscow has pointed up indications that the second stage of the conference is moving toward conclusion. Thus Moscow has noted a Swedish delegation proposal for the establishment of a working group to examine the questions involved in preparing for the final stage in Helsinki. TASS on 21 February cited "circles close to the conference" as saying that this initiative was a "graphic indication of the progress" at the conference. And Tolkunov in his 27 February IZVESTIYA article said the Swedish proposal had "met with approval." Tolkunov went on to review in some detail preparations underway in Helsinki for hosting the third stage, citing Finnish officials as expressing readiness to offer hospitality to "state leaders" at "the earliest date."

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CHINA

MAO TSE-TUNG REMAINS OUT OF PUBLIC VIEW FOLLOWING NPC

Two heads of government who recently visited China are now known to have been received by CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung. During 1973 and 1974 Mao received all visiting heads of state or government. Mao's last publicly reported activity was when he received West German CSU leader Strauss on 16 January, during the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC). He did not appear at the NPC or at the party plenum preceding it, and he has made no public appearances in Peking since last May, apparently having left Peking during the summer.

Mao did not meet with Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Williams in early February, nor has he met thus far with visiting Congo Prime Minister Lopez or with Mozambique Liberation Front President Machel. The evidence is not yet conclusive that Mao's appearance pattern has altered, because Williams was on a "working visit" and had met Mao as recently as November, Lopez at last report was still in China and had just toured Mao's birthplace, and Machel is now in the DPRK but is expected to return to China before leaving for home. While Machel is not a head of state or government, as president of a front supported by the PRC, he would usually have been received by Mao. Premier Chou followed his usual pattern and received all three leaders.

Mao's absence comes at a time when China is embarking on a new campaign announced as being run on Mao's orders. The campaign was sparked by an instruction attributed to Mao on the need to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship. It stresses the need to obey central party orders and observe discipline, while hinting at possible purges for those who slip away from the correct line. Mao's absence from view may merely reflect his preoccupation with the campaign, but it seems equally likely that the campaign reflects the need felt by central authorities to maintain order as Mao fades from the political scene.

YAO WARNS ECONOMIC PROGRESS NO EXCUSE FOR IDEOLOGICAL ERROR

A major article by Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, published in the March RED FLAG and carried by NCNA on 2 March, reflected Peking's desire to maintain order and economic discipline in order to meet the goals set by Chou En-lai in his report to the

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Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in January. However, Yao strongly warned both cadres and masses that the post-NPC emphasis on meeting economic goals must not be interpreted as license to return to the system of material incentives, which occurred prior to the cultural revolution. While stressing that communist forms may be developed "gradually," Yao indicated that backsliding is absolutely impermissible.

The possibility of future purges of "backstage abettors" within the party for giving young workers "incentives to take the capitalist road" was not ruled out by Yao, but the tone of the article seemed to suggest that there is still time for errant cadres to return to the correct path. The urgency of Yao's warning to backsliding cadres was made clear in the article, which frankly proclaimed that "as for the few who have sunk deep into the quagmire of capitalism, they must be told sharply: Comrades, mend you ways right now!"

Signed articles by Yao are highly authoritative: they were used during the cultural revolution to signal major shifts in policy. Yao's last publicized article appeared in the August 1968 issue of RED FLAG under the title "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," and marked the start of a massive PLA crackdown on faction-ridden Red Guards. Similarly, Yao's September 1967 article entitled "Comments on Tao Chu's Two Books" was used to guard the general orientation of the cultural revolution from attacks by both the extreme right and the extreme left, but particularly from the ultraleft "May 16" group. Yao's November 1965 article "On the New Historical Play 'Hai Jui Dismissed from Office,'" which attacked historian Wu Han, is generally credited with setting the cultural revolution in motion. During the cultural revolution Yao became a close associate of Chiang Ching and was named to the Politburo at the Ninth party congress in April 1969.

In his current article Yao zeroed in on the need to avoid resurrecting the capitalist system of work incentives, a sensitive subject that has apparently been the basis for many disputes at all levels in recent years. Citing alleged crimes by Lin Piao in order to respond to current discussions, Yao denounced Lin "as a fanatic advocate of material incentives" and asserted that Lin had called for "the use of money as a stimulus to workers." He attacked Lin for trying to widen wage differentials and singled out young workers as especially susceptible to material inducements. Yao called upon young workers to deepen their study

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of the need for proletarian dictatorship, warning that "young workers, particularly those who have become cadres, must consciously reject the material inducements of the bourgeoisie . . . and must not become light-headed in a dazzling world of commodities, exchange by means of money, philistine flattery, sycophancy and factionalism."

Turning his attention to high-level party members who favor using incentives to stimulate production, Yao complained that the "inexperienced newly engendered elements openly break the law, while cunning bourgeois elements of long standing direct them from behind the scenes--this is the common occurrence in class struggle in our society today." Suggesting the possibility of forthcoming purges of cadres found guilty of using material incentives, Yao stressed that "we must adhere to the principle of laying emphasis on hitting the backstage abettors in dealing with corrupted young people who have committed crimes." Yao called upon all party members, "especially the high-ranking cadres," to deepen their study of the dictatorship of the proletariat and rid themselves of bourgeois "ideas and styles of work."

While putting the entire party establishment on notice to guard against the emergence of new bourgeois elements seeking to restore production incentives, Yao did not call for a revolutionary mass movement from below to correct backsliding within the party. He called instead for a period of "nationwide stability and unity" while gradually creating, "step by step" conditions in which it would be "impossible for the bourgeoisie to rise." Yao's unhurried view on the time required for cleansing society of capitalist impurities was reinforced by a Mao instruction publicized for the first time in the article, which quoted Mao on the need for struggle even when the communist stage of development has finally been reached.

PROVINCIAL Several provincial radios have already publicized
RESPONSE what appears to be emerging as the key phrase from
 Yao's article--the need for a period of "stability
and unity." For example, a SOUTHERN DAILY editorial broadcast by
Canton radio on 2 March listed "stability and unity in the whole
country" as one of the benefits of studying the theory of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The editorial argued that cadres
must have a high-level of theoretical understanding in order to
avoid "wavering between left and right or even being fooled and
deceived." Wuhan radio on 2 March linked the need to promote "stability
and unity" with meeting economic production tasks, calling upon

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local cadres to maintain their "revolutionary enthusiasm. . . and stimulate the national economy this year." And a 2 March Lanchow radio report on a provincial meeting devoted to studying the need for proletarian dictatorship called for work to "eliminate factors harmful to stability and unity" and urged local cadres to "overfulfill this year's plans for development of the national economy."

SPRING FARMING EDITORIAL ORDERS ATTENTION TO IDEOLOGY

The annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming, published on 28 February, concentrated its attention on the need to study the dictatorship of the proletariat and ordered leaders to conduct direct investigations "on the actual state of class struggle in the rural areas." Leading cadres were told to engage in study and criticism at the "forefront of production" alongside commune members and workers, while also participating in labor themselves. Like last year, the editorial stressed only the use of ideological incentives to spur production, calling on leading organizations to further arouse the "socialist enthusiasm" of cadres and masses. The editorial made the usual reference to maintaining "party policies for the rural areas," an assurance that ownership and distribution levels are to remain constant at present.

This year's editorial stressed the importance of planning. Perhaps indicating some further erosion in production team autonomy, it called for "all-round planning and coordination" concerning use of the labor force so that it "can be diverted toward spring planting in a planned manner." The editorial picked up the traditional call for taking "grain as the key" while insuring all-round agricultural development, a slogan that was inexplicably missing from the editorial last year. The editorial also contained the usual provision that all economic sectors must give priority to agriculture, ordering them to "organize forces" in support of spring farming.

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PRC - TAIWAN

PEKING MARKS TAIWAN ANNIVERSARY WITH LOW-KEY OBSERVANCE

Peking's treatment of this year's 28th anniversary of the 28 February 1947 Taiwan Uprising indicates that the current PRC tactic is to encourage internal rebellion against the "Chiang clique," rather than warn of possible active intervention by the PRC. This tactic contrasts with that reflected in comment on the anniversary last year, when the xenophobic stage of the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign seemed to be affecting PRC foreign policy pronouncements, and PRC spokesmen referred to a possible PLA role in the liberation of Taiwan. At that time former KMT General Fu Tso-i pointedly warned Taipei that the "Taiwan Straits are no longer an obstacle to the liberation of Taiwan," a reference to the withdrawal of U.S. naval forces from the straits.* The harshness of PRC rhetoric soon moderated as the year progressed and the anti-Confucius campaign changed its focus.

Like previous observances of the Taiwan Uprising since they were reinstituted in 1973 after a lapse of several years, the Peking commemorative meeting was hosted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the major address was given by PRC Overseas Chinese specialist Liao Cheng-chih. While Liao dropped all references to PLA "liberation," he did not revert fully to the conciliatory line enunciated in 1973. At that time, in the wake of Sino-U.S. rapprochement and growing PRC international stature, Liao and other speakers had seemed to feel that a significant number of the Taipei leaders themselves might feel constrained to open negotiations, and they specifically exhorted "military and administrative personnel of the Chiang clique" to make arrangements to achieve unity. This year Liao denounced the Chiang clique while stating "our deep conviction that the patriotic forces in Taiwan will unite and gain in strength." Liao repeated the formulation, sounded in both 1973 and 1974, that most of those who went to Taiwan from the mainland are "patriots" and that all "patriots belong to one family, whether they come forward early or late."

* The ideological campaign during this period focused on the evil influence of foreign culture and some spokesmen seemed to call for reduced PRC foreign trade. Also, in response to the anti-Confucius campaign, Taipei began a drive to praise Confucius, which was bitterly denounced on the mainland. Last year's Taiwan commemoration is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 March 1974, pages 15-17.

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The commemoration this year was marked at a somewhat higher level than usual, with CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying leading the turnout. While the meeting produced no military warnings, the military was much more in evidence than previously. Although Yeh was not identified as PRC defense minister, he and Hsu Hsiang-chien, the second ranking leader present, were both identified, among other titles, as vice chairmen of the party's military commission. Also in attendance were the deputy chief of staff, Yang Cheng-wu, and a number of other active military leaders. In 1973 no military leaders attended the meeting and last year only a deputy chief of staff attended.

Liao's speech this year treated Taiwan as an integral part of the nation. He noted that 12 NPC delegates were of Taiwan origin and that two had been elected to the NPC Standing Committee, stated that the patriotic democratic parties were represented at the session, and repeated Chou's brief and routine remarks on Taiwan at the NPC. He called on those in Taiwan to continue their struggle against the "Chiang clique" and expressed "firm support" for them. Liao invited Taiwan "compatriots" to visit the mainland, assuring them of "freedom of entry and departure." He also invited Taiwan athletes to take part in China's third national games in September.

Liao did not accuse the United States or the Soviet Union of having designs on Taiwan, though he routinely claimed that the two countries are continuing their rivalry for world hegemony. Last year he had specifically warned Taipei against trying to "flirt" with Moscow. Liao denounced "a handful of anti-China and anticommunist diehards abroad" for trying to "dip a finger in the pie of China's Taiwan province," a formulation used in the past to refer to Japanese rightists. Liao specifically denounced the Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN for working hand-in-hand with the "Chiang clique," an accusation leveled by PRC media in the past.

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K O R E A

PYONGYANG WARNS OF "RETALIATION" AFTER NEW BOAT SINKING

The sinking of another North Korean boat by the ROK Navy off Korea's western coast on 26 February--the third coastal incident since December 1974--has provoked Pyongyang to escalate its protest to the level of Foreign Ministry spokesman. In the previous two recent incidents Pyongyang had limited itself to KCNA "authorized statements," with only the latest instance eliciting a Foreign Ministry-level response. This is the highest-level DPRK statement in response to such an incident since April 1969, when an even more authoritative DPRK Government Statement was issued after the North shot down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft. Although the new Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement itself did not explicitly threaten "retaliation," such a warning was raised in the latest KCNA "authorized statement," the first time since 1971 a KCNA statement has done so. Pyongyang's use of such language is somewhat unusual, but there are precedents.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, issued by Pyongyang media on 28 February, two days after the incident, accused the South of a "surprise attack" on Northern "fishing boats . . . on the high seas." It also claimed U.S. planes had "joined in" the incident and called this an "undisguised provocation." The statement described the South's action in this and two other recent incidents involving Northern boats a "premeditated maneuver" to provoke a war under U.S. "instigation." The statement noted that the Korean armistice agreement "to date" has been maintained because of the North's "patient efforts," but added "there is a limit to our patience." Listing additional charges against the South, the statement also complained of the South's "discourteous act" in "refusing to answer an emergency telephone call," presumably a call from Pyongyang on the North-South "hotline" during one of the latest incidents, although Pyongyang did not specify the date or occasion of the call.

KCNA STATEMENT
ON "RETALIATION"

The KCNA "authorized statement" issued the day before the Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, on 27 February, warned the United States and the ROK to cease "reckless military provocations" or suffer "retaliation." The theme of retaliation also was played in KCNA reports and Pyongyang radio accounts broadcast on 26 February while the incident was unfolding, as well as in a 28 February NODONG SINMUN commentary on the incident. KCNA "authorized statements"

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protesting incidents generally have couched their warnings in the vague formulation that the South would be held responsible for the consequences of its action. The only other time in recent years that a KCNA "authorized statement" has explicitly warned of retaliation was in March 1971, when Pyongyang protested Seoul's treatment of returned Southern fishermen whom the North had captured and then released. Going beyond the Foreign Ministry spokesman's explanation of the latest incident, the 27 February KCNA statement adopted the standard Pyongyang line that Seoul was attempting to divert attention from its domestic political difficulties by raising tension on the Korean peninsula, specifically by triggering a "new shocking incident." Unlike the Foreign Ministry spokesman, the KCNA statement claimed the attack was the result of specific U.S. "instigation."

Less than two hours after the DPRK boat was sunk on 26 February, Pyongyang radio broadcast a message from Cho Myong-il, the North's vice chairman on the North-South Coordination Committee, demanding that the South stop its "provocation" and warning that if it did not, Seoul would be held responsible for any situation that "might develop." According to the radio announcer, Cho's message was broadcast rather than telephoned because "the time is now past for direct North-South telephone links." The following day, though, Pyongyang broadcast a telephoned protest by Cho to the South, in which he demanded the South apologize, punish those involved, and "immediately send back" the North's fisherman. Seoul, however, has not reported rescuing any survivors from the northern boat. On the 28th, in another telephone protest, Cho claimed that the North's boats were attacked in waters "where our fishing boats have heretofore been engaged in normal fishing operations," and Cho warned Seoul it might incur "very uncommon consequences" for its actions.

The North's language in this latest incident is unusual, though not unprecedented. In an Army Day speech in February 1974, for example, not long after a North-South confrontation over access to several UN-supervised islands off Korea's western coast, General Yi Yong-mu warned that the United States, Japan, and the Pak government would be dealt a "retaliatory blow" if they continued to "aggravate" the situation in Korea. And, in language nearly identical to that in the latest Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, General Yi said "peace" had been maintained through the North's persistence and patience, and he cautioned that there was a "limit to our patience."

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MALAYSIA

MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY SHOWS CONCERN OVER SPLINTER GROUPS

Broadcasts during the past six weeks by the PRC-based clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR) have elaborated earlier reactions of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to the formation from within its own ranks last year of the splinter Malayan Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (MCP/M-L). These broadcasts reveal the MCP's sensitivity to challenges from the new group over doctrinal orthodoxy and its preoccupation with internal unity in the wake of its second split in five years.* Three broadcasts--a 25 November statement by the MCP's Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) broadcast on 25 January, an 11 February radio commentary, and a statement by the MNLF Central Committee broadcast on 18 February--refuted charges by the new MCP/M-L that the MCP is pursuing "revisionist" policies and wrecking the Malayan revolution. In addition, a VOMR radio editorial broadcast on 1 February marking the 26th anniversary of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) stressed the need for internal unity and strict adherence to central leadership in the conduct of protracted armed struggle.

The broadcasts of 25 January and 18 February attributed the recent split to the emergence of an "anti-party group" of "careerists" in the MNLA's 12th Regiment, 2nd District as early as 1968. The broadcasts indicated that this anti-party faction within the MCP's military arm had disagreed with the decision announced in a statement of 1 June 1968--and reaffirmed in a lengthy second statement of 25 April 1970--to pursue a "correct" strategy of armed struggle expanding into areas south of the Thai-Malay border bases. In collusion with agents of the "Razak clique" desperate to

* The MCP/M-L, together with its associated front organization, the Malayan People's Liberation League, and military arm, the Malayan People's Liberation Army, announced its existence as a distinct group on 22 October 1974. Initial comment on the break broadcast in early November and subsequently in late December is discussed in TRENDS of 8 January 1975, pages 14-15. The first split in the MCP's ranks had occurred in 1970 when the 8th Regiment of the MCP's military organization, the Malayan National Liberation Army, broke away to form the Malayan Communist Party/Revolutionary Faction (MCP/RF).

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prevent the strategy's implementation, the broadcasts alleged, the group attempted to spread dissension within the base areas and to usurp the leadership of the MCP Central Committee from within. Failing in this, the anti-party group established itself as the MCP/M-L and staged a demonstration of its independence last October in order "to raise the red flag to oppose the red flag."

While attacking the splittists as merely "a group of enemy agents in the revolutionary ranks," comment carried on the VOMR radio has taken pains to reassert the MCP's revolutionary credentials and has dwelt on the necessity of "willing acceptance of party discipline." Noting the teachings of Chairman Mao, "the tutor of revolution," on the importance of party discipline and citing MCP constitutional prohibitions against factional activities, the 1 February VOMR editorial expressed hope that party members deceived and confused by the splittists' tactics would "return to the party's correct line."

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U. S. - L A T I N R E L A T I O N S

HAVANA NONCOMMITTAL, MOSCOW CRITICAL ON KISSINGER SPEECH

Cuban coverage of Secretary Kissinger's 1 March speech in Houston on U.S.-Latin American relations has been confined to brief news reports. These have, however, noted the Secretary's overtures to Cuba, with Havana's international service quoting Kissinger's statement that he saw no benefit in "perpetual antagonism" between the United States and Cuba. Soviet media have given little attention to the speech. TASS brushed off the Secretary's remarks on Cuba, noting only that "Kissinger said there can be no change" in U.S. relations with Cuba until OAS sanctions are limited. The only comment thus far has come at the lowest level, in a Spanish-language broadcast of the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, which criticized the speech as offering "no hope of deep change" in the policy of "economic aggression" illustrated by the U.S. Trade Reform Act.

KISSINGER SPEECH Havana media have not commented on the speech, in line with the frequent Cuban media practice of deferring comment on U.S. policies and developments until after Cuban leaders have spoken. Havana radio's international service carried a short report on the speech in several newscasts, and a similar account was carried by PRENSA LATINA. The only monitored reference to the speech in any Havana domestic service broadcasts has been a one-sentence report on the 2d that Kissinger had "defended the U.S. foreign trade law" at a dinner in Houston. The account broadcast by the international service took particular note of Kissinger's indications of a thaw in U.S. relations with Cuba, reporting that "the head of U.S. diplomacy said that the United States will make changes in its bilateral relations with Cuba." Both the radio and PRENSA LATINA quoted the Secretary as saying he saw "no benefit in perpetual antagonism" between the two countries.

Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress told Latin listeners on 4 March that Secretary Kissinger had said "absolutely nothing new" and that U.S. policy in Latin America had come "to a dead end." The commentary asserted that the U.S. dialogue with Latin America--interrupted when Latin criticisms of the U.S. trade act led to the cancellation of a meeting of OAS foreign ministers--could not be revived, and it urged Latins to "follow the road to independence." Noting that the "international climate is favorable to Latin America," Radio Peace and Progress encouraged Latin Americans to

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seek markets in socialist countries and thus lessen their dependence on the United States. The commentary did not mention the Secretary's discussion of Cuba, and TASS' 2 March dispatch from Washington on the speech dismissed the subject in one sentence, but did note that Kissinger listed "Cuba's posture in the Western Hemisphere" as one of the topics for discussion on his scheduled April visit to Latin American countries. In a slightly editorialized account, TASS said the Secretary "admitted" that old arguments had introduced bitterness and suspicion in U.S.-Latin relations. TASS also represented Kissinger as "admitting" that U.S. control of the Panama canal was viewed by Latins as "a violation of the national sovereignty" of Panama.

CRITICISM OF U.S. TRADE POLICY Both the TASS account and the Havana radio report noted remarks by Kissinger in his Houston speech on the U.S. Trade Reform Act, which was signed into law in early January and has been the object of strong Latin criticism.* TASS reported Kissinger as saying that the U.S. Government was making efforts to revise the clauses of the trade act, but that these efforts would largely depend on Latin countries' policies toward the United States. Havana's international service reported Kissinger as criticizing Latin American countries for attempting to integrate in order to defend their raw materials and for rejecting the U.S. trade law.

Both Soviet and Cuban media had earlier praised Latin reaction to the trade law, citing condemnation by the OAS permanent council and the Argentine Government decision to postpone indefinitely the OAS foreign ministerial meeting scheduled for Buenos Aires in March. Havana's "Our America" feature asserted on 25 January that the OAS action represented a "single voice" in defiance of the "imperialist policy of the United States."

Publicizing Latin criticism of the trade act, PRAVDA's Konstantin Geyvandov said on 25 January that the "discriminatory" nature of the act had been rejected by the OAS, which saw the new law as an attempt to assign Latin America the role of "raw material tributary of U.S. monopoly capital." In the same vein, an IZVESTIYA article on 1 February asserted that Latins "no longer intend to tolerate the domination of imperialist monopolies" and had rejected the "flagrant encroachment upon their sovereignty" implied in the trade law.

* Initial communist media coverage of Latin reaction to the trade act is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 31-32.

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YUGOSLAVIA

TITO GLOOMY ABOUT WORLD SITUATION, SCORES NONALINED DISUNITY

Contending that the world situation is "again becoming tense," Tito painted a generally dark picture of international political and economic affairs in a 3 March speech at the inaugural meeting of the Council of the Federation. He not only leveled his standard charges against the "imperialists" and the "great powers" but also chastised the nonaligned states for their lack of unity.

In commenting on security in Europe, Tito acknowledged that the "processes of detente . . . have begun." He seemed less than certain, however, that the CSCE would be successfully concluded. He twice referred to it as a contingent possibility, one that would have good results "if" it actually takes place. As recently as the beginning of the year, Tito had professed to see "encouraging signs" that the conference would end successfully in 1975.

In an implicit reference to the proposed conference of European communist parties, Tito also emphasized that both CSCE and "the activity of the European communist parties and all other progressive forces" must be based on "equality" and the "strengthening of each country's independence."

NONALINED DISUNITY Attributing the past successes of the nonaligned states to their united action, Tito asserted that their current solidarity is "not up to the required standard." He seemed to be particularly concerned about the status of the more impoverished countries, and he denounced the aid that had been offered by other nonaligned states as being neither efficient nor timely. Tito stressed the need for the more wealthy of the nonaligned states to render economic aid to those countries in greater need. Underscoring the importance of unity in the face of "imperialism," he called upon the nonaligned states to regard their security as indivisible--to look upon an attack on one as an attack on all. Tito specifically exhorted nonaligned countries not to be "passive observers" of the Cyprus crisis, urging them to make the "maximum effort to prevent the worst from happening."

Heretofore, Tito had been generally optimistic about the nonaligned movement. For example, he noted in a 29 November 1974 speech that

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while he had "not always" been pleased with the activity of "some" nonaligned states, he no longer had any complaints on this score. And in a 21 January statement on the nonaligned movement, Tito noted that "despite certain differences," the nonaligned countries had "succeeded in safeguarding and, indeed, through action, still further consolidating their unity."

Tito avoided specific references to the United States but many of his critical remarks were clearly directed at Washington. The United States, for example, was clearly the butt of his critical remarks on international "monopolist" activities and "threats" against oil producing countries. The United States was also no doubt included in Tito's criticism of the "great powers" for their "vast arsenals" and for their increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean and the "Arab-Persian" Gulf, "despite the opposition and protests of the countries of this region." Such activities, he concluded, contribute neither to international cooperation nor to confidence in the policy of "some of the big powers."

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NOTE

SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS: Moscow has reacted to the continuing impasse in Soviet-Japanese negotiations on a peace treaty by publicizing more explicitly the Soviet Union traditional opposition to concessions on Japan's claims to the "northern territories," four islands off the Hokkaido coast occupied by the USSR after World War II. Soviet media have also more openly criticized the Japanese press and hinted at unhappiness with some Japanese politicians. For example, a 27 February PRAVDA article pegged to the 50th anniversary of Soviet-Japanese relations complained that "certain" Japanese politicians' attempts at "balancing" between Moscow and Peking by exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift indicated that "prejudice, myopia, and an opportunistic approach" to Japanese-Soviet issues "still persist in certain Japanese political circles." The article also rapped the Japanese press for a tendency to "artificially substitute the same old irritating 'territorial questions'" for other issues of interest to both countries. Other Soviet comment has been even more critical of the press, accusing it of a pro-Chinese bias at best, and at worst of collusion with Peking. A 26 February IZVESTIYA article on the anniversary of Soviet-Japanese relations by T. Guzhenko, head of the USSR-Japan Society and USSR Minister of Maritime Fleet, noted that the USSR felt the primary way to overcome the "difference of positions" on a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty was to display a "realistic approach and take into account the existing realities that took shape after World War II."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PEKING ENDORSES DUAL TACTICS IN AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLES

Accommodating to developments in the African national liberation struggle over the past year, Peking has shifted from its previous heavy stress on armed people's war as the sole correct path toward an acknowledgment that political negotiations and mass movements are also important. In modifying its line and now advocating "revolutionary dual tactics" of negotiations backed by armed struggle, Peking has seemingly been trying to keep in step with the changing attitudes of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) following the overthrow of Portugal's Caetano government, Lisbon's successful negotiations granting independence to its former African colonies, and recent calls for reconciliation with black adversaries by the remaining white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. Peking has taken great pains to differentiate its stance from that of the Soviet Union, whose policy it characterizes as a thinly disguised sell-out of African interests.

China's current treatment of Africa is in marked contrast to its doctrinaire approach during most of the 1960's. Peking at that time stridently proclaimed Africa's "ripeness" for revolution and supported the struggles of dissident groups and insurgent movements against newly independent African governments as well as white-ruled colonial enclaves. The Chinese in this period gave support largely to leftist groups which espoused a rigid, Maoist dogma, thereby fostering splits and splinter groups within the established African liberation movements. In sponsoring its own clients then, Peking was opposed to the OAU and its call for a united African front against the white minority and colonial governments.

In resuming its attention to foreign affairs at the end of the 1960's, Peking became more moderate in its attitude, ending support for splinter groups within the African liberation movements and beginning to back OAU efforts to unify the liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South Africa. Giving heavy propaganda support to OAU calls for armed resistance by united and well-coordinated liberation movements, Peking did not espouse negotiations. In line with the increasingly anti-Soviet slant in PRC foreign policy in general, the Chinese also began to give more attention to alleged Soviet expansion in Africa while diminishing their attacks on the U.S. and British roles on the continent.

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Typical of China's line was a 1 October 1973 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the 24 September 1973 founding of the Republic of Guinea Bissau. This editorial pointed out that the insurgent government had been formed as a result of "a hard and bitter armed struggle" since 1963. It praised the OAU policy of supporting the anti-Portuguese insurgents, and it underlined the dictum that "armed struggle is the only way for the African people to win national independence." Though Peking avoided specific criticism of either superpower, it alluded to Moscow as well as Washington in warning the Africans against "neocolonialism of all shades and hues" that was intensifying aggression and subversion against Africa.

PORTUGAL'S DECOLONIZATION The new situation in Africa evolving from the April 1974 overthrow of the Caetano government and Lisbon's subsequent call for withdrawal from Africa caused Peking to adopt temporarily a low posture on African liberation. The Chinese marked time on this issue until the OAU formulated a new line at the June 1974 meeting of African heads of state. A 20 June 1974 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the meeting endorsed the OAU's shift away from past, exclusive reliance on armed struggle. It backed the June summit's demand that Portugal agree to grant "total independence" to its African colonies and that Lisbon enter into negotiations for that purpose with liberation movements recognized by the OAU. The editorial echoed the summit meeting's warning that unless these demands were met, "there will be no other way but pursuit and intensification of the struggle for national independence."

While subsequent Chinese propaganda followed the OAU lead in maintaining that African armed struggle was the main reason for Portugal's decision to seek a negotiated withdrawal from Africa and admonished that the insurgents must not lay down their guns until all their demands had been met by Lisbon, Peking also amplified its newly favorable line on negotiations. Thus, PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials of 6 and 14 September 1974 and 25 January 1975, marking Lisbon's assent to independence for Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola respectively, characterized each event as a successful result achieved by negotiations backed with armed struggle.

The Chinese expounded on this "fight-talk" strategy in a speech by Chuang Yen, the PRC representative at the December 1974 UNGA debate on decolonization. Chuang endorsed the Africans' use of "revolutionary dual tactics," comprising negotiations backed by armed struggle, to

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defeat the colonialists' "counterrevolutionary dual tactics," which employed public calls for negotiations along with secret preparations for renewed military attack. He underscored the current Chinese stance on the role of negotiations in the liberation struggle by noting that "armed struggle is the most essential form of struggle to win national liberation, but it does not preclude necessary negotiations under favorable conditions."

RHODESIA, Peking has been markedly more vocal in warning
SOUTH AFRICA against alleged doubledealing by the Salisbury
and Pretoria regime than it had been against
Lisbon. Thus, Chinese media have repeatedly denounced recent
calls by the Smith and Vorster governments for peace and cooperation with internal black nationalist adversaries and neighboring African governments, describing these as perfidious "counter-revolutionary doubledealing tricks" designed to cover up the minority regimes' continued armed suppression of dissidents at home and their enhanced preparations for armed attack against their neighbors.

Typically, a 27 January 1975 NCNA correspondent's report spurned South Africa's recent stress on its allegedly generous "black homelands" plan, calling the plan a devious trick intended to lure the Azanian people away from their struggle for liberation. It recommended the use of "revolutionary violence" against Pretoria's continued practice of "counterrevolutionary violence." An 18 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article charged that talk of "southern African detente" by Rhodesia and South Africa amounted to "stalling tactics" designed to allow the regimes to extinguish the flames of revolution. In effect acknowledging the application of the "fight-talk" strategy, Commentator said that under present circumstances armed struggle was "the only alternative method of making the Pretoria racists and their accomplices listen to reason" and negotiate favorably on black nationalist demands.

SOVIET ROLE In attacking Moscow's African policy, Peking has
focused on charges of Soviet complicity with
Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. In the wake of the June 1974
OAU summit call for all nations to refrain from diplomatic relations with Portugal until Lisbon's decolonization in Africa was complete, Peking charged that Moscow's quick establishment of ties with Lisbon was evidence of Soviet doubledealing at African expense. The Chinese alleged that Moscow was attempting to moderate the African liberation movement's demands against Portugal and to preserve

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some degree of Lisbon control in Africa, with the ultimate aim of gaining access to bases in Portugal and in the African colonies for use in Moscow's rivalry with the United States. Peking repeatedly charged that Moscow was fostering disunion within the liberation movements and was relying on alleged Portuguese good will to bring about decolonization, advising that liberation would never result from "peaceful transition" or be offered as a "gift" from the colonialists, but must be gained by continued struggle.

Seeming to link Moscow with Rhodesia and South Africa, Peking has pointed to alleged similarity between the white regimes' calls for detente and Moscow's own detente policy. A 19 November 1974 Peking radio broadcast asserted that Moscow, by claiming that "the development of political detente has created still more favorable conditions for the national liberation movement," played directly into the hands of Vorster and his recent use of "doubledealing tricks."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 FEBRUARY - 2 MARCH 1975

<u>Moscow (2781 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1026 items)</u>		
China	(7%)	8%	Congo Prime Minister	(--)	9%
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(6%)	7%	Lopez in PRC		
Grechko in India	(--)	4%	Cambodia	(1%)	9%
Brezhnev Greetings to Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Union	(--)	3%	[Second National Congress Communique]	(--)	3%
Guinea Bissau Prime Minister Mendes in USSR	(2%)	2%	[Ieng Sary in PRC]	(--)	3%
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov in USSR	(--)	2%	Nepal King Birendra's Coronation	(1%)	5%
			USSR	(4%)	5%
			Mozambique Liberation Front President Machel in PRC	(11%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.